The distinction between personal level explanations and subpersonal ones has been subject to much debate in philosophy. We understand it as one between explanations that focus on an agent’s interaction with its environment, and explanations that focus on the physical or computational enabling conditions of such an interaction. The distinction, understood this way, is necessary for a complete account of any agent, rational or not, biological or artificial. In particular, we review some recent research in Artificial Life that pretends to (...) do completely without the distinction, while using agent-centred concepts all the way. It is argued that the rejection of agent level explanations in favour of mechanistic ones is due to an unmotivated need to choose among representationalism and eliminativism. The dilemma is a false one if the possibility of a radical form of externalism is considered. (shrink)

McDowell’s minimal empiricism holds that experience, understood as providing conceptually articulated contents, plays a role in the justification of our beliefs. We question this idea by contrasting the role of perceptual experience in moral and non-moral judgments and conclude that experience per se is irrelevant in the former case and should also be so in the latter one: only with the help of adequate beliefs experience can provide a connection with the world. We conclude with some remarks concerning the importance (...) of experience. (shrink)

nos últimos anos, John McDowell tem proposto uma concepção de filosofia em que o objetivo da disciplina não é oferecer teses substanciais, mas antes revelar modos de pensar e premissas ocultas que estão na base da filosofia construtiva. Esta visão terapêutica tem sido chamada ‘quietismo’ e deve muito a algumas idéias favoritas de Wittgenstein ao longo de toda a sua vida. No entanto, a obra de Wittgenstein (e, talvez, também a de McDowell) parece oscilar entre duas compreensões de quietismo: pode-se (...) ser quietista por não macular aquilo que é mais importante com discussões explícitas ou pode-se ser quietista por não ter nada a dizer. Argumentaremos que o segundo tipo do quietismo não implica recusar em se ocupar com a filosofia do passado, nem tampouco adotar uma atitude contemplativa. A concentração sobre o particular, em ética tanto quanto em qualquer outra área da filosofia, é suficiente para minar as ambições universalistas da filosofia tradicional e descortinar um aumento na ação filosófica. (shrink)

In this paper we reject the nature–culture dichotomy by means of the idea of affordance or possibility for action, which has important implications for landscape theory. Our hypothesis is that, just as the idea of affordance can serve to overcome the subjective–objective dichotomy, the ideas of landscape and ecological niche, properly defined, would allow us to also transcend the nature–culture dichotomy. First, we introduce an overview of landscape theory, emphasizing processual landscape theory as the most suitable approach for satisfying both (...) cultural and naturalist approaches. After that, we introduce the idea of affordance and we analyze a tension between sociocultural and transcultural affordances (affordances that depend on cultural conventions and affordances that depend on lawful information and bodily aspects of agents). This tension has various implications for landscape theory and ecological niches. Our proposal is that sociocultural and transcultural aspects of affordances could be systematically accommodated if we apply niche construction theory (the theory that explains the process by which organisms modify their selective environments) as a methodological framework for explaining the emergence of ecological niches. This approach will lead us to an integrative account of landscapes as the products of the interaction between human and environmental elements, making it a clear example of a concept that transcends the nature–culture dichotomy. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker distinguishes two senses in which testimonial injustice is epistemic. In the primary sense, it is epistemic because it harms the victim as a giver of knowledge. In the secondary sense, it is epistemic, more narrowly, because it harms the victim as a possessor of knowledge. Her characterization of testimonial injustice has raised the following objection: testimonial injustice is not always an epistemic injustice, in the narrow, secondary sense, as it does not always entail that the victim is harmed (...) as a knowledge-possessor. By adopting a perspective based on Robert Brandom's normative expressivism, we respond to this objection by arguing that there is a close connection, conceptual and constitutive rather than merely causal, between the primary and the secondary epistemic harms of testimonial injustice, such that testimonial injustice always involves both kinds of epistemic harm. We do so by exploring the logic and functioning of belief and knowledge ascriptions in order to highlight three ways in which the secondary epistemic harm caused by testimonial injustice crystallizes: it undermines the epistemic agency of the victim, the epistemic friction necessary for knowledge, and the possibility of occupying particular epistemic nodes. (shrink)

José Luis Moreno argumenta contra lo que considera una variedad de formas de fetichismo político. Lo que tienen en común es depositar una confianza excesiva o monolítica en algún mecanismo democrático en particular. Compartimos su motivación y en esta nota crítica intentamos llevar sus argumentos más lejos preguntándonos si diferentes tipos de conocimiento políticamente relevante pueden distinguirse, si en algunos contextos es necesario dejar las decisiones en manos de expertos y si la propuesta de Moreno cae en un nuevo tipo (...) de fetichismo con respecto al sorteo como mecanismo capaz de eliminar injusticias sociales profundas. (shrink)

This paper argues that the normative character of our unreflective situated behaviour is not factual. We highlight a problematic assumption shared by the two most influential trends in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science, reductionism and enactivism. Our intentional, normative explanations are referential, descriptive or factual. Underneath this assumption lies the idea that only facts can make true or false our attributions of cognitive, mental and agential abilities. We will argue against this view by describing the main features and problems of (...) reductionism and enactivism and then we will offer two arguments against this shared factualist assumption: (1) normative vocabulary is ineliminable if we want a complete explanation of our situated practices; and (2) the factualist assumption is a species of the is-ought fallacy. Finally, we will claim that a folk psychological explanation of our normative practices is fully compatible with ontological naturalism when such descriptivist or factualist assumption is rejected. (shrink)

It is common to criticize the idea of objectivity by claiming that we cannot make sense of any cognitive contact with the world that is not constituted by the very materials of our thinking, and to conclude that the idea must be abandoned and that the world is ‘well lost’. We resist this conclusion and argue for a notion of objectivity that places its source within the domain of thoughts by proposing a conception of facts, akin to McDowell’s, as thinkable (...) while independent of any act of thinking. However, we do so without any empiricist commitment. (shrink)

Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal—through avowal—the other third-personal—no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions—is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; this enable some instances of (...) Moore-paradoxical cases to be meaningful. In this paper we reflect on the consequences of this view for the acquisition of beliefs, and argue that, as in the moral case, excessive concentration on a thirdpersonal understanding of thought undermines the very idea of being directed to the world and of being capable to fully own our own beliefs. We suggest that maybe too much attention to epistemic virtues or tojustification is misdirected and could produce beliefs that are themself not first-personal enough. (shrink)

Davidson’s anomalous monism, his argument for the identity between mental and physical event tokens, has been frequently attacked, usually demanding a higher degree of physicalist commitment. My objection runs in the opposite direction: the identities inferred by Davidson from mental causation, the nomological character of causality and the anomaly of the mental are philosophically problematic and, more dramatically, incompatible with his famous argument against the third dogma of empiricism, the separation of content from conceptual scheme. Given the anomaly of the (...) mental and the absence of psychophysical laws, there are no conceptual resources to relate mental and physical predicates. We fall in the third dogma if we claim that the very same token event is mental and physical. One of the premises must be rejected: I will claim that we do not need a law to subsume cause and effect to be entitled to speak of causation. Davidson has never offered an argument to back this premise. Against such a dogma I will sketch some ideas pointing towards a different conception of causality, singularist and undetachable from explanatory practices. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: The aim of my commentary is to complement some of the main points defended in the target article. In particular, I want to explore further the central role of agent-level explanations and of evolution for our understanding of a meaningful environment. I finish by wondering whether an excessive focus on ontological questions could be problematic for a proper defence of (...) ecological psychology. (shrink)

In this paper, we offer a criticism, inspired by Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, of the enactivist account of perception and action. We start by setting up a non-descriptivist naturalism regarding the mind and continue by defining enactivism and exploring its more attractive theoretical features. We then proceed to analyse its proposal to understand normativity non-socially. We argue that such a thesis is ultimately committed to the problematic idea that normative practices can be understood as private and factual. Finally, we offer a (...) characterization of normativity as an essentially social phenomenon and apply our criticisms to other approaches that share commitments with enactivism. (shrink)

In this paper we challenge the notion of ‘normativity’ used by some enactive approaches to cognition. We define some varieties of enactivism and their assumptions and make explicit the reasoning behind the co-emergence of individuality and normativity. Then we argue that appealing to dispositions for explaining some living processes can be more illuminating than claiming that all such processes are normative. For this purpose, we will present some considerations, inspired by Wittgenstein, regarding norm-establishing and norm-following and show that attributions of (...) normativity to non-social agents are deeply paradoxical. The main conclusions of our discussion are: (1) circular and internal explanations centred on the stability of living systems are insufficient to account for processes where the environment plays an important role, such as adaptation. Enactivism is not an explanatory alternative to evolutionary biology but needs it as a complement to accounts focused on the internal self-assembly of organisms; (2) though we share enactivism’s anti-representational spirit, we argue that ecological psychology can offer a better account of perception. (shrink)

Educating the Virtues David Carr Routledge, 1991. Pp. 304. ISBN 0?415?05746?9. £35. The Philosophical Theology of St Thomas Aquinas By Leo J. Elders E. J. Brill, 1990. Pp. 332. ISBN 0?04?09156?4. $74.36. The State and Justice: An Essay in Political Theory By Milton Fisk Cambridge University Press, 1990. Pp. x + 391. ISBN 0?521?38966?6. £10.95 pbk. Perspectives on Language and Thought: Interrelations in Development Edited by S. A. Gelman and J. P. Byrnes Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. xii + 524. (...) ISBN 0?521?37497?9. £50. Aristotle's First Principles By T. H. Irwin Oxford University Press, 1989. Pp. xviii + 702. ISBN 0?198?24717?6. £17.50 Pbk. Truth and Eros: Foucault, Lacan, and the Question of Ethics By John Rajchman Routledge, 1991. Pp. 155. ISBN 0?415?90380?7. £10.99. Logical Forms By Mark Sainsbury Blackwell, 1991. Pp. 408. ISBN 0?631?17777?9. £11.95. Form and Transformation. A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus By Frederic M. Schroeder McGill?Queen's University Press, 1992. Pp. xiv + 136. ISBN 0?7735?1016?8. £34.95. Did The Greeks Believe Their Myths? An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination By Paul Veyne, translated by Paula Wissing The University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pp. 161. ISBN 0?226?85434?5. £8.75 Pbk. What is Philosophy? By Dietrich von Hildebrand Routledge, 1991. Pp. lvii + 242. ISBN 0?415?02584?2. £12.99. (shrink)

This article studies the thought of those Holy Fathers who most vigorously opposed Astrology as the primary source of negative arguments in the medieval Christian debate about the validity of Astrology until the arrival of translations of Arabic astronomical works.

El objetivo es conocer las circunstancias y tratamiento judicial de asesinatos por violencia de género. Se plantea el diagnóstico forense de muerte, se exponen resultados de la investigación realizada por Genovés et al. en 2018 sobre150 casos de muerte por violencia de género en Andalucía, se plantea un posible patrón de conducta basado en la teoría de los pensamientos obsesivos y rumia silenciosa. Los resultados muestran una violencia anunciada, sin trastornos mentales graves, los asesinatos se mantienen constantes en el tiempo, (...) la violencia empleada suele ser excesiva en comparación con otras muertes, el instrumento más usado es arma blanca, el agresor no se esconde, no suele arrepentirse, la calificación ha sido de asesinato en un 79%, concurriendo alevosía en un 91% de los casos, la indefensión de la víctima es buscada y utilizada por el agresor, el domicilio familiar es el lugar donde más asesinatos se producen. Se aprecia una evolución positiva en la aplicación del derecho. Es necesaria la perspectiva de género en la Justicia. (shrink)

La crisis en la que estamos inmersos tiene entre sus causas una profunda crisis de relaciones entre las personas y los Estados. Si superamos esta crisis de relaciones, asumiendo nuevos paradigmas políticos y sociales, aseguraremos la base de una nueva convivencia democrática, integradora y solidaria, que responda al reto de la globalización y la interdependencia. Sólo se saldrá de la crisis de relaciones desde valores basados en la solidaridad, asentada en la confianza mutua. Algunas propuestas para regenerar el sistema de (...) valores apelan el paradigma de la fraternidad: la globalización de la solidaridad como respuesta a la crisis de la globalización. (shrink)

Este artículo defiende que toda acción es un suceso que entraña, responsabilidad agente. Toda acción es el suceso que es el "hacer" de alguien. La responsabilidad del agente que define una acción es el tipo que justifica el premio-castigo. Esto implica que la acción es, en todos los casos, revocable y socialmente sancionada, igual que lo es la responsabilidad que la define. Más aún, si la identidad personal se ha de comprender dentro del reino de la acción, las teorías de (...) corte narrativo, más que las aproximaciones mentalistas, se encuentran mucho mejor posicionadas para llevar a cabo esta labor de comprensión.Este artículo defiende que toda acción es un suceso que entraña, responsabilidad agente. Toda acción es el suceso que es el "hacer" de alguien. La responsabilidad del agente que define una acción es el tipo que justifica el premio-castigo. Esto implica que la acción es, en todos los casos, revocable y socialmente sancionada, igual que lo es la responsabilidad que la define. Más aún, si la identidad personal se ha de comprender dentro del reino de la acción, las teorías de corte narrativo, más que las aproximaciones mentalistas, se encuentran mucho mejor posicionadas para llevar a cabo esta labor de comprensión.This paper argues that an action is an event that essentially conveysagent responsibility. Any action is the event that is someone’s doing. Andagent responsibility, which defines action, is the kind of responsibility that justifiesreward and punishment. This means that action is, in all cases, defeasileand socially santioned, such as it is the type of responsibility that defines action.Moreover, if pesonal identity is to be understood within the frame ofaction, narrativist kind of theories, rather than mentalist approaches, are in amuch better position to do the job. (shrink)

Dennett (1988) provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett’s argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, it rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information-processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, the argument defends that qualia are constitutively representational in an externalist understanding of this. The core (...) of the argument is contained in section 3. In the first, I contrast a minimal conception of qualia, relative to which their existence is not under dispute, with the sort of view to which I will object. In the second I set the stage by presenting the facts about (minimal) qualia on which a Dennett-like argument can be based. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article examine l'argumentation de Sullivan en faveur du principe que toute chose a une cause. On soutient que les critiques de Smith et d'Allen ne lui rendent pas justice et que Sullivan est justifié de maintenir que nous n'avons pas de bonnes raisons de nier la vérité de ce principe. Sa défense finale, cependant, qui semble basée sur une approche thomiste, échoue. Être contingent et être causé sont séparables. Il semble au bout du compte que nous n'ayons pas (...) non plus de bonnes raisons de nier la fausseté du principe en question. (shrink)

La literatura portuguesa ha estado a lo largo de su historia especialmente atenta a la construcción de la imagen identitaria de Portugal. Esta preocupación, visible en todos los planos de la vida social, no solo en la producción de los discursos culturales, se ve confrontada al menos desde las dos últimas décadas con el empuje del proceso globalizador, fuerza homogeneizadora que transforma el perfil de las sociedades contemporáneas. El discurso literario acompaña este proceso, lo alimenta y forma parte de él, (...) como tratamos de ver a partir de algunas novelas de reciente publicación en Portugal, abiertas a la simbolización de nuevos paisajes y conflictos que se alejan de la representación en exclusividad del espacio portugués y del debate identitario nacional. (shrink)

En este artículo se va a estudiar la relación que existe en Leibniz entre verdad eterna, razón soberna y libertad divina. Si la razón soberana se puede constituir como juez supremo es porque contiene unas verdades eternas que Dios no ha creado sino que pertenecen a la misma esencia divina. Estas verdades en cuanto esencias, tienden a existir en la medida de su perfección, pero no existirán necesariamente, sino que Dios las pone en la existencia mediante un acto libre. Ante (...) la posibilidad de pensar que Dios pudiera verse obligado a elegir aquello que mejor, Leibniz sostendrá que Dios elige crear siempre lo mejor en un primer decreto máximamente libre y voluntario. de este modo el resto de sus elecciones son también máximamente libres y racionales. (shrink)

La cultura occidental padece una enfermedad endémica: el dualismo, con el riesgo de generar una cultura esquizofrénica. El reduccionismo antropológico reduce lo ético al ámbito exclusivo del hombre. Es necesario sustituir el mundo como entorno por el mundo como copertenencia, lo que nos lleva hacia una nueva imagen del hombre basada en dicho principio de copertenencia con el correpondiente cambio antropológico para evitar que el mayor peligro para el hombre sea el hombre. La ética deviene así en instancia normativa de (...) la construcción de la ciencia. (shrink)

Este artículo expone el resultado de la puesta en práctica de una metodología docente novedosa a través de la que se busca superar las dificultades que el proceso de enseñanza/aprendizaje encuentra en las asignaturas jurídicas que forman parte de los grados universitarios no jurídicos. Comienza destacando el papel que tienen las tecnologías de la información y la comunicación en dicho proceso y, significativamente, el campus virtual. Seguidamente, desgrana cada uno de los elementos de la metodología docente aplicaba, entre los que (...) encuentra la gamificación. Concluye con la determinación de las consecuencias de la experiencia desarrollada. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende caracterizar a la bioética como un saber que acontece en la frontera del tiempo. Se trata de un saber de frontera, ubicado del lado del acontecer, por su carácter tentativo y abierto. La frontera del tiempo sitúa la conciencia moral en momentos de gestación, cuando la reflexión abunda en perplejidades y tantea respuestas. Existen dos modos de dar contenido a los relatos bioéticos: la memoria que recuerda y la esperanza que anticipa.

El título de este artículo se refiere a los dos libros que he trabajado en la Universidad de Cambridge, bajo la dirección de Peter Burke. El primero, La diosa Fortuna, se publicó en 2006 y obtuvo el Premio Nacional de Ensayo en 2007. En la actualidad estoy escribiendo el segundo libro que llevará por título Identidades barrocas. Este nuevo concepto es un “tipo ideal” y se contrapone a las dos formas de construcción de identidades colectivas analizadas por la filosofía política (...) contemporánea: el cosmopolitismo de cuño kantiano y el romanticismo político. El núcleo del artículo se dedica al análisis de dos de las metáforas fundamentales en que se expresa la identidad barroca en la literatura y en las artes: el yo como laberinto y la identidad como sueño. (shrink)

A través de este artículo se llegará a la conclusión de que la obediencia es una expresión de la dialéctica entre la encarnación de Cristo y su kenosis, superando la provisionalidad de las realidades terrenas y consagrando a Dios la facultad de disponer de la propia vida. Pero este caminar entre la vida y la muerte, encuentra su punto culminante en el misterio pascual de Jesucristo, el cual contribuye a la glorificación de Dios en el hombre, haciendo de la experiencia (...) de Dios en Jesucristo, el proyecto fundamental de la vida. El hombre participa de este misterio mediante la contemplación y lo extiende hacia fuera gracias a la predicación. Se pondrá así de relieve la dimensión pneumatológica y eclesial de la obediencia, que parte de la imagen de un hombre apasionado y entusiasta del sueño de Dios sobre la humanidad, revelado y realizado en Jesús, por la fuerza del Espíritu de amor. Through this article you will come to the conclusion that obedience is an expression of the dialectic between the incarnation of Christ and his ‘kenosis’, surpassing the impermanence of earthly realities and consecrating to God the faculty to dispose of one´s own live. But this journey between life and death, finds its culmination in the Paschal Mystery of Jesus Christ, which contributes to the glorification of God in man, making the experience of God in Jesus Christ, the fundamental project of life. The Man participates in this mystery, through contemplation, and extends it out through the preaching. In this way, it will express the pneumatologic and ecclesial dimension of obedience, which part of the image of a passionate and enthusiastic man of God's dream for humanity, revealed and realized in Jesus, by the power of the Spirit of love. (shrink)

John Quidort considers individual work, among other activities, the most suitable form of appropriation. Giles of Rome seems to share this view but, in contrast to John’s opinion, he claims that all possession is legitimate only when the owner is baptized, i.e., when he is part of the Church community. This view depends on Giles’s political thought, that the temporal order should be subordinated to the ecclesiastical order. John, on the other hand, when referring to the independence of the two (...) powers, considers work and other activities independent from the Church, although linked to Christian ethics. (shrink)

Francisco Fernández-Zarza Pérez conocido como Jano, fue un artista polifacético dentro del mundo publicitario y cinematográfico. Destacó por su versatilidad a la hora de retratar a las estrellas cinematográficas pertenecientes al “star-system” nacional e internacional durante la época de la posguerra y la transición española.Partiendo de la importancia del cartel como medio de transmisión del mensaje, pretendemos descubrir si sus carteles, entre los años 1940 y 1970, además de actuar como reclamo para dar a conocer las películas también actuaron como (...) reflejo de los estereotipos sociales mediante la representación de los roles femeninos. (shrink)